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1. The lower court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint 
with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, are proper parties plaintiff. 
3. The Governor's veto of Item 34 was and is valid. 
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E. ALLAN BATEMAN, Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT 
On March 10, 1949, the 28th Legislature of Utah, 
in House Bill No. 293, made an appropriation of public 
funds as follows: 
4
'Item 34. To Superintendent of Public In-
struction—Uniform School Fund Research. From 
the Uniform School Fund. $20,000.00." 
On March 19,1949, Governor J. Bracken Lee vetoed 
this item by authority of Article VII, Sec. 8 Utah Con-
stitution, which reads as follows: 
"If any bill presented to the Governor con-
tains several items of appropriation of money, he 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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may object to one or more of such items while 
approving other portions of the bill; in such 
case he shall append to the bill at the time of sign-
ing it a statement of the items which he declines 
to approve, together with his reasons therefor, 
and such items shall not take effect unless passed 
over the Governor's objection as in this section 
provided." 
His veto message with respect to this item read as 
follows: 
" I hereby specifically veto the following 
items: 
Item 34. Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion-Uniform School Fund Research-$20,000.00. 
The administration appropriation for this 
department should be ample to provide for this 
work.' ' 
Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, filed suit in Third District 
Court, praying for a declaratory judgment that the 
vetoed funds were not available to the defendant (R. 1), 
who had made demand upon proper authority for said 
funds on the theory that the Governor's veto was void 
and the funds therefore available. Plaintiffs claim they 
are proper parties in requesting declaratory relief under 
these facts, alleged more particularly in the complaint. 
Upon motion to dismiss filed by defendant, on the 
ground that the complaint failed to state facts upon 
which relief could be granted (R. 4), the Hon. A. H. 
Ellett, trial judge, dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with 
prejudice, foreclosing opportunity to amend (R. 6). 
Plaintiffs appealed from the decision to this Honor-
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able Court (R. 7) and filed their designation of record 
on appeal (R. 8). 
ISSUES 
1. Did the lower court err m dismissing plaintiffs' com-
plaint WITH PREJUDICE? 
2. Are the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, proper parties plain-
tiff in this action praying for declaratory relief? 
3. / / plaintiffs are proper parties, was the Governor's 
veto of Item 34 valid? 
ARGUMENT 
1. The lower court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' com-
plaint with prejudice. 
Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits 
amendment once as a matter of course. By dismissing 
the complaint with prejudice, Judge EUet has foreclosed 
plaintiffs' right to amend under the Rules. 
2. The plaintiffs, as taxpayers, are proper parties plain-
tiff. 
Title 104-64-2, U.C.A. 1943, provides as follows: 
"Any person interested under a deed, will 
or written contract, or whose rights, status or 
other legal relations are affected by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or 
validity arising under the instrument, statute, 
ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal rela-
tions thereunder. ' ' 
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4 
Under similar declaratory judgment acts, courts 
generally have determined, as was pointed out in 174 
A.L.R. 555, that : 
" A taxpayer is generally deemed to have a 
sufficient interest to obtain a declaratory deter-
mination as to the validity of statutes or ordi-
nances under which public authorities will pro-
ceed to levy taxes or make expenditures of public 
money.'J 
In our case, no one logically will contend that tax-
payers are not pecuniarily interested in the $20,000 
appropriation from the Uniform School Fund, since 
this fund consists of tax money. $20,000 will be saved 
to the taxpayers, included in which are the plaintiffs, if 
the Governor's veto is valid, and the same amount would 
be lost to the same taxpayers, if the veto is invalidated. 
4 
Neither can one contend, assuming the taxpayers 
have an interest in the Uniform School Fund, that the 
facts in this case would not fall within the provisions 
of the declaratory judgment act hereinabove quoted. 
A case directly in point is Zoercher vs. Agler (1930) 
202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186, 70 A.L.R. 1232, where, under 
a declaratory judgment statute, taxpayers were allowed 
to test the power of a state tax board to review and alter 
a tax rate established by municipal ordinance. The 
court pointed out that a public right may be determined 
by declaratory relief, and that the taxpayers in that 
case had personal and property rights that would be 
injured if a tax were illegally levied, justifying a declara-
tion of their rights under the statute. Furthermore, the 
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court determined that such relief might be accorded 
where only a part, and not all of the taxpayers were 
parties. 
Many other cases adjudicating the propriety of 
declaratory relief where taxpayers are parties seeking 
an interpretation of rights under statutes, ordinances 
and the Constitution are collected in 174 A.L.R. 555. 
Other cases not collected there, which subscribe to this 
principle, are as follows: 
Harrell vs. Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E. (2) 115, 
140 A.L.R. 455 (1947), where a taxpayer was granted 
declaratory relief in construing a voting registration 
statute; 
Allison vs. Sharp, 209 N.C. 477, 184 S.E. 27 (1936), 
where citizens were granted declaratory relief when 
they were denied registration; 
Skinner vs. Phoenix, 54 Ariz. 316, 95 P (2) 424; 
United Public Workers vs. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 
91 L. ed. 754, 67 S. Ct. 556 (1947), where employees 
under the Hatch Act were held entitled to a declaratory 
judgment as to the constitutionality of the Act; 
Bareham vs. Rochester, 246 N.Y. 140, 158 N.E. 51, 
68 A.L.R. 127 (1927), where taxpayers were granted 
declaratory judgment with reference to an election 
statute; 
State ex rel. Sullivan vs. Price, 49 Ariz. 19, 63 P (2) 
653,108 A.L.R. 1156 (1937). 
We respectfully submit that there should be no 
question as to the public right involved, and the personal 
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and property rights of the plaintiffs involved, justifying 
declaratory relief in our case. 
3. The Governor's veto of Item 34 was and is valid. 
The Governor specifically vetoed Item 34, and gave 
his reasons therefor, in accordance with Article VII , 
Section 8 of our Constitution. In such a case, and under 
Constitutions like ours, the authorities are in complete 
agreement that a veto of an Item like the one vetoed 
in our case, is valid and not subject to attack. 
Historical reason for justifying such a veto is given 
in 37 Harvard Law Review 382. Some of the authorities 
establishing our contention that Governor Lee's veto 
was and is valid, and particularly declaring that any 
reason given for the veto is sufficient, are as follows: 
Birdsall vs. Car rick, 3 Nev. 154 (1847); 
Storer vs. Downey, 215 Mass. 273, 102 N.E. 
321, 119 A.L.R. 1191; 
Cascade Tel. Co. vs. Tax Commission, 176 
Wash. 616, 30 P (2) 976 (1934); 
City of Tacoma vs. Tax Commission, 33 P (2) 
899 (1934); 
Erskine vs. Pyle, 213 N.W. 500; 51 S.D. 262 
(1927); 
Dickinson vs. Paqe, 120 Ark. 377, 179 S.W. 
1004 (1915). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiffs respectfully submit that : 
(1) the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' com-
plaint with prejudice, (2) the plaintiffs are proper 
parties plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action brought 
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on the facts in this case, and (3) the Governor's veto 
of Item 34 is valid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RITER, COWAN, HENRIOD 
& FINLINSON, 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
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